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Abstract Theories of intergenerational obligations usually take the shape of the-
ories of distributive (social) justice. The complexities involved in intergenerational
obligations force theorists to simplify. In this article I unpack two popular simpli-
fications: the inevitability of future generations, and the Hardinesque assumption that
future individuals are a burden on society but a benefit to parents. The first
assumption obscures the fact that future generations consist of individuals whose
existence can be a matter of voluntary choice, implying that there are individuals
who are responsible and accountable for that choice and for its consequences. The
second assumption ignores the fact that the benefits and burdens of future individuals
are complex, and different for different ‘‘beneficiaries’’ or ‘‘victims.’’ Introducing
individual responsibility for procreation as a (crucially) relevant variable, and
allowing a more sophisticated understanding of the impact of new individuals,
generates grounds to prioritize the individual’s interest in responsibility for (creating
and equipping) future individuals over any collective intergenerational obligation.
I illustrate this by introducing a series of moral duties that take precedence over, and
perhaps even void, possible collective redistributive duties.
Keywords Distributive justice  Future generations  Justice between
generations  Responsibility
Introduction
The topic of obligations towards future generations was a fairly unpopular one
among political philosophers until it became a hunting ground for theorists of social
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justice interested in Rawls’s savings principle (cf. Tremmel 2007), almost
immediately followed by theorists of environmental ethics, who fielded the interests
of future generations against the exploitation of natural resources by present
generations (cf. e.g., Barry and Sikora 1978). In such areas of environmental politics
as climate change, the appeal to the interests of future generations (‘‘the children are
our future’’) is as commanding as considerations of health are elsewhere. Recently,
future generations have also been introduced in theories of International Relations
(e.g., Rendall 2007).
Theories of (re)distributive social justice (and that includes environmental
justice) aim to de- and prescribe parameters of a formula: who owes what, when,
where, to whom. Possibly more importantly, social justice theories try to delineate
the ‘‘why,’’ i.e., they try to account for the choices of variables in that formula.
When obligations between generations are discussed nowadays, it is usually in the
context of such theories, and usually as generalized obligations between sets, i.e.,
generations, rather than individuals (cf. e.g., Van Liedekerke 2004; Beckerman
2006). In addition, generations are often assumed to contain (in sum) a near-infinite
number of individuals, and some of the resources to be distributed are assumed to be
finite but beyond that remain undefined—to list but a few heuristic simplifications
(for more, see Tremmel 2006). Given that there are good reasons to simplify
complex questions, as we shall see in a moment, it seems that characterizing
obligations towards future generations in such condense terms is innocent while (in
both senses of ‘‘while’’) making the implied question ‘‘what do we owe?’’
answerable.
Yet such simplifications are not as innocent as they may seem to be. Together,
they cast the relations between present and future humans in the mould of social
liberal political thought,1 with its assumptions of mutually advantageous cooper-
ation, shared or collective responsibility for at least part of all natural resources and
of the ultimate social product, and collective ownership of those resources (thus
allowing involuntary taxation and redistribution). By framing the question of
obligations towards future humans in terms of distribution of collective assets over
generations, there is a risk that too little attention is paid to the creation of the
context that defines and determines any specific question of distributive justice. As I
shall try to show in this article, the social liberal perspective may be highly popular
and even dominant, yet it is neither the most natural starting point for an analysis of
obligations across generations, nor the most obviously legitimate one.
The context makes all the difference. If, for example, the next generation were
also known with certainty to be the last, we might want to choose very different
principles describing our obligations to ‘‘future generations’’ from those we would
choose in the almost certain knowledge that there will be further generations.
Another example: from a Marxist perspective, justice is the problem rather than the
solution—it is the redistribution of scarcity rather than the creation of sufficiency,
and there is no reason to assume that justice between generations is any different.
1 Note that this includes left-libertarians (cf. Steiner 2002; Vallentyne 2002; Steiner and Vallentyne
2009) who embrace notions like collective ownership of (some) natural resources or legitimate
redistribution of ‘‘rent’’ owed over use of natural resources.
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Simplification is helpful in so far as it allows a ceteris paribus assessment of the
relation between the two or more variables or concepts that have not been
‘‘simplified away.’’ Hence, the results of any debate on aspects of obligations to
future generations may be contradicted or may have to be amended once a new
variable is included, e.g., once genetic engineering is assumed to be possible
(Farrelly 2005), once generalized resources are replaced by specific depletable or
irreplaceable resources (cf. Ball 1985), once animals are included (particularly when
they are included as producers of goods and not merely as livestock or as subjects;
cf. also Vallentyne 2005), or, the perhaps most famous source of complications in
any debate on obligations towards the future, once generations are recognized as
individuals. At that moment the famous Non-Identity Problem rears its head (Parfit
1984; cf. e.g., Carter 2002; Partridge 2002; Johnson 2003; Bell 2004; Mulgan 2006;
Page 2006): we cannot call policy A (resulting in say, the non-existence of non-
Aryans) more or less just towards the individuals who will exist in the future than B
(say, the disappearance of all Aryans), at least not if A and B result in the existence
of completely non-identical sets of future individuals Na and Nb; no one in A exists
in B (and vice versa) and therefore no one in A is better or worse off than in B (and
vice versa).
Simplification is helpful in gaining an insight in the relation between specific
variables; it stops being helpful when conclusions that are only proven valid under
ceteris paribus conditions, i.e., provisional conclusions, are confused with universally
valid conclusions. In the present text, two relatively popular assumptions in
intergenerational justice theory will be questioned: the inevitability of future
generations and their costliness. Showing that these assumptions really are unrealistic
simplifications helps us to become aware of a third simplification, viz., the idea that
obligations between present and future humans are necessarily a matter of
redistributive justice from present to future generations. Framing intergenerational
obligations as obligations of distributive social justice is a political choice, one that
voids, denies, or ignores among others the role of individual responsibility in the
creation of future individuals. A complete and universally valid theory of
intergenerational obligations should begin by asking whether rather than assuming
that specific transactions between generations are a matter of social justice, or in other
words, a collective responsibility, instead of an individual affair.
The choice for the assumptions of inevitability and cost serves mainly to prove a
point. The assumption that future individuals or generations manifest themselves
involuntarily but certainly, and the assumption that they are recipients of goods
only, for whom present generations only make sacrifices, rarely occur together in
academic literature (cf. Young 2001). As a matter of fact, the latter assumption,
detectable in the famous and oft-quoted Tragedy of the Commons (Hardin 1968),
seems to be necessary to make precise statements on population policy possible, but
it is an implicit denial of the first assumption. What matters, however, is that neither
of these assumptions is innocent, let alone irrelevant. A different, and from a social
liberal point of view more plausible, view of the inevitability and of the value of
future individuals (to be developed in subsequent sections) suggest a fundamentally
different philosophical and thereby political priority for questions of intergenera-
tional distributive justice. Questions about the shape of intergenerational
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distributive justice (in cases like resource management, climate change or debt
policies) may often be perceived as socially most urgent, but that does not mean that
their being framed as legitimate collective responsibilities should be accepted as
given.
Inevitable Individuals
One of the many variables often kept constant in work on obligations between
generations is that of the inevitability of future individuals. Who each single
individual may turn out to be, and whether each single individual will exist, may be
determined by necessity or contingent factors—but that future generations and
individuals will manifest themselves involuntarily yet certainly is usually taken for
granted. Two fairly fresh examples stem from Jennifer Heyward and Axel
Gosseries. Heyward (2008) demonstrated beautifully how the Rawlsian represen-
tation of future generations behind the veil of ignorance avoids the non-identity
problem, while satisfying the demand of proponents of deliberative democracy that
all affected by decisions should participate in decision-making, which is something
that straightforward representation of future generations by present generations
cannot. Heyward’s hidden assumption is that future generations’ interests must be
represented even if they would never exist—hence they seem to have interests even
when they will never exist. Axel Gosseries (2008), in his frank discussion of the still
unrepaired holes in arguments for rights for future generations, acknowledges that
rights can and perhaps should be granted to presently existing people as
representatives of future generations, rather than (for now fictitious) future
people—but again, the implication is that they seem to have present interests even
if they will never exist.
Assuming the inevitable emergence of future generations may seem a natural
assumption but it is not. The (in)evitability of the existence of a future individual
does not just have consequences for the size and claims of future generations (and
for the job prospects for philosophers of intergenerational justice), it also has causes
that in their turn, at a prior stage, predetermine the range and character of our
obligations—and this in two ways. First, the inevitability assumption obscures the
fact that our obligations may be the result of deliberate individual behavior, not of
risk or accident (a popular ground for risk-sharing cooperative institutions based on
solidarity), and secondly, it thereby also changes the balance between distributive
justice and other types of moral obligation.
Responsibility and choice play a major role in principles of justice: more often
than not, they determine whether a claim to part of the social product or
compensation for a disadvantage is justified or not. To assume that the existence of
future individuals is inevitable results in the attribution of responsibility for (duties
and obligations to, rights and claims of) countless future individuals on the
collective shoulders of the present generation—where, as I hope to show, it ought
not necessarily lie.
The assumed inevitability of future individuals also changes the balance between
two types of justice: distributive justice and justice in exchange. Distributive justice
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is often equated with social justice; it is based on the assumption of shared
responsibilities and shared resources, attributed hierarchically by (representatives of
the) collective over members.2 Justice in exchange is equated with market justice,
fair pricing, and fair trade; it is based on the assumptions of individual
responsibility, individual ownership, and equality between exchanging parties.
Assuming future generations’ inevitability allows one to conceptualize their
existence as no one’s work in particular, thereby as a collective responsibility, and
thereby as a Inevitability makes distributive justice overshadow further types of
moral obligation as well. On some views of justice, justice requires reciprocity; but
since (or in so far as) future individuals do not exist, a reciprocal relationship with
them is impossible, therefore justice between non-overlapping generations is
impossible (cf. Page 2006). As Hillel Steiner frankly puts it, ‘‘future persons (…)
have no rights against present persons nor, therefore, any rights that present persons
save or conserve anything for them’’ (Steiner 1994, p. 261). On other views, like
Brian Barry’s, reciprocity is not a necessary condition for justice. If justice is not the
right word, ethical obligations of a non-reciprocal nature may nevertheless exist—
their form may even (but need not) mimic that of principles of justice. That does not
make the choice between justice and other concepts inconsequential: founding
obligations to future generations in—say—natural duties that take precedence over
justice (cf. Rawls 1999) may well make them stronger and more universal than any
by definition controstice.
The inevitability axiom is questionable—obviously already by nature, clearly
also because of cultural attitudes concerning procreation and education about
fertility, and finally increasingly due to the development of technologies granting
more and more control to presently existing individuals over their procreative
activities. Future individuals are increasingly voluntary possibilities rather than
inevitable necessities, and that makes the existence of the collective entity ‘‘future
generation,’’ by definition, equally avoidable. Procreation itself has become a
‘‘human originated change’’ (to use a phrase coined by IPCC).
Assume for a moment that newly created individuals lay a prima facie valid
claim on ‘‘our’’ resources. This would make children a burden and a problem.
Liability, responsibility for causing a problem, makes a difference for the question
who should solve it and carry the burdens of the solution (how much of a difference,
when, and where, are different questions). Likewise, if or in so far as children are a
benefit, responsibility for their creation makes a difference for who can claim those
benefits. It is here, where the input for theories of justice is created, that the
difference between distributive social justice and justice in exchange originates. We
can perhaps, on the one hand, attribute the newly created individual’s talents to
morally arbitrary accidents of birth, and the development of her talents to her
environment, thus supporting the case for collective property and distributive
justice. On the other hand, we also have to make room for the individual’s
responsibility for the choices he or she makes, thereby for legitimate private
property and for justice in exchange. For one, if responsibility were irrelevant,
2 Redistributive justice is distributive justice applied to resources previously possessed (though not
necessarily owned) by others than those who will now receive a share.
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ethics itself would be voided, making shame and honor, punishment and reward,
sheer fantasies.3 Moreover, if individuals cannot be held responsible for their
choices, the collective that allegedly enabled the individual to produce a benefit or
burden, being made up of similar non-responsible individuals, could not be
responsible for its contribution either—hence both the individual’s and the
collective’s claim to benefits or burdens would be equally unfounded, and
distributive justice would be as unjustifiable as justice in the exchange of private
holdings.
Next to responsibility for the causal process of creating future generations, moral
responsibility ‘‘after the fact’’ is equally relevant in assigning the ‘‘benefits’’ and
‘‘burdens’’ of future individuals. When, say, a traffic accident occurs, the person
who caused the accident may be seen as primarily responsible for ‘‘righting the
wrong.’’ Yet this does not clear bystanders of a prima facie moral responsibility to
help, next to or even instead of the perpetrator. Assuming for the sake of simplicity
that the victim bears no responsibility whatsoever for his fate, the Rawlsian notions
of arbitrariness and solidarity seems to apply here, that is, since no one deserves his
or her talents, disabilities, or any identifying traits, nor the (dis)advantages incurred
by them, we ought to share such burdens and benefits fairly. In our example, no one
deserves to be the victim of a traffic accident or suffer its consequences, hence (and
other things being equal) we are all obliged to help the victim. To make a long story
short: causal responsibility for the creation of a benefit or burden does not void, nor
is it the same as, moral responsibility; the latter requires the availability of choice
and of the means to act on that choice, and may be optional (granting a ‘‘privilege’’)
rather than a duty.4 Since future generations are not traffic accidents, nor necessarily
anything like traffic accidents, moral responsibility for their fate is neither evidently
the collective’s, nor evidently a duty.
When we recognize the relevance of individual responsibility before and after the
fact, we can also begin to distinguish between different sets of ‘‘commitments’’
(duties and freedoms) associated with different types of (causation of) future
individuals. Merely to illustrate this point, I shall distinguish five relatively simple
examples—please note that many more are imaginable (cf. Ekeli 2004). They serve
only to illustrate, not to justify anything (Table 1).5
First of all, different actors can be causally responsible for the creation of a new
individual, and if or in so far as they have the means and opportunity, they are also
3 In a way, we face here the classic problem of autonomy versus authority (Wolff 1990): without the
capacity to be moral and be responsible for being moral, without the capacity to make and obey one’s
own laws, there can be no foundation or justification for subsuming oneself to the (moral) authority of any
rules, of one’s own design or another’s.
4 While all of this is expressed in a broadly Kantian-Rawlsian vocabulary, the same arguments can be
made, mutatis mutandis, in utilitarian terms: causal responsibility for the creation or destruction of
welfare is not the same as moral responsibility—in this case, the latter would mean actual capability to
contribute to aggregate welfare.
5 By the same token, the fact that I give two meanings to the concept of responsibility (moral
responsibility for causation and for later care for future individuals) serves only to illustrate that
responsibility has multiple dimensions and that these dimensions are relevant to the question of
obligations to future generations. For the most prominent—albeit controversial—analysis of conceptions
of responsibility—albeit in the context of national versus individual responsibility, see Miller (2007).
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the first to be morally responsible for the consequences of creation. Under ideal
circumstances, parents consensually choose to procreate voluntarily, out of love or
out of prudence (Case 1). Let us assume the two to be mutually exclusive, with
prudence being the considered judgment that creating a new individual is, overall,
better than not doing so, while procreation out of love stands for any ‘‘unconsid-
ered’’ decision to procreate: love for each other, love of children, a desire to allow
one’s physical and mental potential to fully flourish, and so on.
Badly motivated or not, Case 1 implies that the parents carry the primary
responsibility, both causally and morally, for the consequences of their actions. It is
only when means or opportunity to be responsible disappear, that other parties
(‘‘bystanders,’’ whom, for reasons of simplicity, I shall here call ‘‘society’’) may
become morally responsible in second instance—may, first of all because society
too needs to have the means and opportunity required for actual responsibility.
Secondly, love as a motive differs from prudence in that it is not so easy to argue
that (for want of a better word) a love child could have happened to all of us as it is
to argue that a prudence child could have been preferred by any of us. Perhaps one
cannot argue with love, perhaps one can—and in the latter case, we could all,
reasonably, have reconsidered our choice before acting on it. While it would have
been unreasonable for us to reject a prudential argument for procreation under the
same circumstances as the parents did when they decided, it would not be
unreasonable for us to reject their (after all, ‘‘unconsidered’’) argument from love.
No child deserves its fate, hence the arbitrariness principle implies that society owes
both types of children in Case 1 exactly the same—but for different reasons: where
prudence ruled, we would have chosen as the parents did, so that the arbitrariness
principle implies a duty to assist, a duty to carry the parents’ responsibility should
they be unable to, while where ‘‘irrationality’’ ruled, we could easily have chosen
differently, making society’s assistance in the parents’ stead more a privilege than a
duty.
Table 1 Some types of obligations to future individuals






1. Love/prudence Yes (parents) Parents Parents Duty
No (society) Society Privilege
2. Accident No (parents) Parents Parents Duty
No (society) Society Duty
3. Mental incapacity No (parents) Nature Society Duty
No (society)
4. Culture of no choice No (parents) Society Society Duty
Yes (society)
5. Rape No (mother) Yes (father) Father Father Duty
No (society) Mother Privilege
Society Duty
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In Case 2, we assume that parents can choose but do not: a child is created totally
involuntarily, i.e., by accident or through sheer stupidity. It happens. While parents
in such cases could have been better prepared (and while they do therefore carry
some moral responsibility), they accidentally were not—and since we may assume
that this could happen to anyone of us, society’s second instance moral
responsibility again takes the shape of a duty.
When parents are mentally totally incapable of choice (Case 3), we can no longer
call them even causally responsible for their acts—rather, it is nature doing its work.
The individuals’ being incapable of carrying responsibility, a fate that could have
happened to us all, society is now no longer morally responsible in second but, by
default, first place.
Case 4 is defined by the absence of the means to carry responsibility, voiding any
room there might otherwise have been for choice. One example would be a
materially impoverished society where procreation, e.g., as an investment in old
age, is a matter of survival—unlike prudence in Case 1, procreation in such societies
does not simply make anyone better off relative to a more or less acceptable
baseline, nor does it even necessarily guarantee that such a baseline will be
established; rather, it is simply a necessary condition for any kind of life. Another
example is a society with an oppressive culture, prescribing child-bearing and/or
fertility at the price of exclusion. In Case 4, it is again unreasonable to attribute even
causal responsibility to parents—they have, by assumption, no choice—nor can we
this time blame nature; both moral and causal responsibility lie with society.
Finally, in Case 5, children are born out of non-consensual relations where no
natural or social causes prevent one party’s voluntary choice: rape. Here, both the
causal and primary moral responsibility for the consequences of creating a new
individual are the father’s. (In attributing causal and primary moral responsibility to
the father for the fate of a child born out of rape, I do not regret imposing Western
liberal values on the vast majority of humankind, who attribute responsibility for
rape differently.) The biological mother’s moral responsibility at best implies that
what she does for her child is based on a privilege; she has no duty to carry the
burdens of an act that—mildly put—could reasonably and as a considered judgment
have been rejected. (I disregard the painful question how and even if the father’s
responsibility should be implemented when, e.g., the mother objects.) Assuming
that the mother does, however, have the means and opportunity to decide whether or
not to give birth to the child, she remains morally responsible, in second instance,
for the consequences. Society comes third, its moral responsibility being a duty
again—since being a woman and being raped could have happened to all of us.
A word of caution is required. The six cases are based on an extremely
oversimplified picture of reality, even if it is more subtle than simply assuming that
future humans will necessarily exist. I assume that the line between voluntary and
involuntary behavior is sharp where, in reality, it rarely is. The same goes for the
distinction between having and not having the means to be responsible. The world of
these five cases is divided between a father, a mother, and an abstract entity called
society—where reality complicates matters considerably by, for one, possibilities
unthought-of in ages before (IVF, sperm and egg donors, surrogate mothers and so
on) and, secondly, distinctions between several social spheres each with their own
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responsibilities—like family and extended family, community, civil society, and the
state. Also, I have in a sense made the questionable assumption that might implies
right: I have assumed that the ability to control procreative capacities implies at least
primarily exclusive moral responsibility for the use of those capacities. To assign
primary responsibility to society (or any other agent), despite the individuals’ actual
control over their capacities, seems to presume the repugnant idea of collective or
corporate management (or worse, ownership) of the individual’s reproductive
organs.
Taking more and more of these exceptions and similar subtleties of life into
account forces us to admit that attributing responsibility for the creation of a new
individual is a matter of practical rationality—judgments will have to differ from
case to case and will have to take countless factors into consideration.
More subtlety will thus make it less easy to decide precisely for which
consequences of procreation individuals are responsible and for which others are,
whether that responsibility is a matter of justice or other duties and, where justice is
relevant, whether it is a matter of distributive justice or justice in exchange. Yet this
supports rather than undermines the case for the relevancy of responsibility, and
thereby for the thesis that moral obligations between generations are not necessarily
obligations of justice, let alone collective obligations to institute a form of
distributive justice.
The Value of Future Individuals
The existence of future individuals is, at least in part, a matter of parental choice,
therefore a choice for a perceived or expected advantage. Particularly advocates of
population policies, however, tend to conceptualize future generations as overall
burdens on society. Contrary to the intuition of many parents, such scholars assume
that future individuals either pose a threat (i.e., they will have the power to demand
and get retribution in our old age) or merely form a burden on the resources of the
presently living, since they apparently detract from our resources but give nothing
back (for more subtle overviews, see e.g., Mulgan 2006, or Tremmel 2006). While
some authors add a degree of subtlety by pointing to limited reciprocal relations
between coming and going generations, creating chains of reciprocity (Howarth
1992), as a rule, the parents and children are nevertheless expected to somehow
benefit from procreation, while the rest of society pays. Garrett Hardin’s Tragedy of
the Commons (1968) is the classic illustration6: here, selfish parents get all the free-
rider advantages of polluting the environment with children.
Not only does this distribution of benefits and burdens seem prima facie unfair—
it is also based on an oversimplification of both the nature and actual distribution of
6 Hardin’s use of procreative strategies and population policy may be seen as a mere illustration of his
main, more abstract point that leaving natural resources ‘‘free for grabs’’ spells individual rationality
resulting in collective disaster. True or not (Hardin’s other work indicates a more than passing interest in
the dilemmas of procreation and population growth), what matters is that anyone who invokes the
Tragedy as an argument in ethical studies on population policy, implicitly takes Hardin’s simplified
distribution of costs and benefits on board, even in contexts where that simplification might be
inappropriate.
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benefits and burdens. If a theory of justice ought to be complete (Rawls 1999), then
we need it to include the attribution of moral responsibility not only for the burdens
imposed by future generations, but also for their benefits to each and every party
involved. Parents, children, family, society, and other entities are all potentially
both recipients and distributors of advantages and disadvantages to others
(cf. Young 2001). What follows is again a rough and ready overview of only
some of the effects of procreation for only a limited number of potentially affected
parties, merely for the purpose of illustration; completeness is not the object.
Parents as recipients, first of all, can obviously benefit in numerous ways from
the creation of future individuals, but it would be too easy to call this the whole
truth. Children may bring joy and pride, but they may also turn out to be
disappointments or worse; they may be an insurance against the frailty of old age, or
not. They may be an answer to social, peer, and family pressure, but in this respect
as well, the costs may outweigh the benefits. In so far as children are created as
producers of future benefits, they are a risky investment, opted for because the
alternative appears less attractive. In another sense, as benefits in themselves rather
than as producers of benefits, children are perhaps less risky investments: barring
PND, parents are almost certain to enjoy all the benefits of parenting—the miracles
of birth, growth, and development, the opportunity to care and foster responsibility,
and so on. Unlike the instrumental advantages of children, these inherent rewards
seem to come with guaranteed benefits (though still at a cost).
One step (or more) removed from parents and their benefits, members of the future
individual’s extended family derive basically the same benefits—both instrumental
and inherent—from their creation, although to a lesser degree (cf. Binmore 2005).
Only siblings are possibly worse off: a new brother or sister often means fewer
resources for them, which in turn may result in reduced prospects in life. Then again,
siblings are social capital; the benefits may outweigh the burdens.
Society as a whole draws less clear benefits from future individuals, unless the
continuation of a society’s existence beyond the life span of those presently living is
seen as a good per se (i.e., regardless of its meaning to individuals—in which
liberals are far more interested). While on average able to contribute less, and
initially merely putting an extra strain on resources in impoverished societies, their
existence seems more beneficial for others in relatively rich welfare states: through
taxes and jobs in care, new individuals can contribute to the wellbeing of the latter.
Those same rich societies, however, will first have to invest in feeding, clothing,
housing and educating the new individuals. All in all, the benefits of new
generations of citizens can only come about as a result of a prior commitment to
make costs, and that prior commitment will be either based on the inevitability of
‘‘costly’’ future individuals, or on an expected inevitable need for their contribution.
Finally, assessing the benefits and burdens of existence for any new individual
him- or herself takes us, obviously, to the core of Parfit’s non-identity problem and,
beyond that, to questions like whether existence or life is good in itself. I want to
avoid those questions here. We may not be able to harm future individuals, i.e., we
cannot make them ‘‘relatively’’ worse off because there is nothing ‘‘relative’’ to
compare them to, but according to Carter (2002) and others, we can make them
suffer (for further circumvention strategies see Howarth 1992; Huang 1997;
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Beekman 2004). We can cause the existence of an individual A so ill and
handicapped that her life is just barely worth living, or even individuals B whose life
is utter torture but who cannot end it themselves and cannot communicate their fate
to others who could end it. A’s and B’s suffering counts for its own sake. By the
same token, we may not be able to benefit future individuals relative to how they
could fare otherwise (they cannot be but who they are), but we are certainly capable
of benefiting them in absolute terms. In sum then, future individuals can be
recipients of benefits as much as of burdens. There is a caveat: present humans
create the next generation and are responsible for its fate, and they partly shape the
conditions under which subsequent generations can exist, but it is the next
generation and not we who have the means and opportunity to create a third; the
next generation carries the causal and primary moral responsibility for the third. We
can neither harm a remote future generation nor make it suffer—but we can burden
next generations with a choice between creating no subsequent generation or one
that will be (not ‘‘worse’’ but) badly off.7
In conclusion: to assume that future individuals only benefit from us while
present individuals pay, or that individual procreators benefit while society as a
whole pays, is an unjustifiable oversimplification.
Implications for Intergenerational Morality
The existence of future individuals is not inevitable; causal and moral responsibility
for their existence and fate can usually be attributed. In addition, parents and
children are not necessarily only recipients of benefits, nor does society necessarily
inherit burdens only (as assumed in Hardin’s Tragedy). With these prejudicial
assumptions removed, both the priority and the remit of principles for intergen-
erational redistribution changes. For instance, since causal responsibility matters,
the Rawlsian notions of arbitrariness and solidarity no longer justify attributing
prima facie moral responsibility for the fate of every future individual to the
collective. Distributive justice takes second place, as a rectification device, to justice
in exchange. The politically urgent questions that and how many natural resources
and artificial capital ‘‘we’’ owe to future generations are certainly not voided but
they do, logically, follow rather than precede the question ‘‘are existing individuals
sufficiently empowered to carry the responsibility for their progeny?’’ The
following seven duties all logically precede and override demands of
7 While A, who is parent to B, who is parent to C, does not cause the existence of C, and while C (we
assume) can neither harm nor benefit A, A does cause B to exist and is (primarily or secondarily) morally
responsible for the consequences of creating B including B’s prospects for procreation, prospects which in
turn include B’s capacity to create C and be responsible for the consequences of creating C, including
consequences for C’s fate. In other words: A’s creation of a time-bomb (e.g., nuclear waste) may
blamelessly disadvantage a remote future generation but it also disadvantages the next generation, and for
this A can be blamed. One solution to the non-identity problem is then to argue that justice (or
obligations) between present and future generations can be reduced to justice between the present and
very next generation, and that responsibility for the fate of later generations is, time and time again,
carried over from the first to the next generation.
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intergenerational redistribution—which does not necessarily imply that they have
political priority.8
(1) If personal responsibility is indeed a good thing, then having a real choice in
whether or not to procreate is a good thing too. From this follows, as a
necessary condition for any justifiable obligation to future generations, a
collective and individual duty to emancipate individuals, that is, to provide not
only adequate sexual education and access to contraceptives, but also systemic
preconditions for individual responsibility like a relatively enlightened sexual
morality, and a socio-economic structure allowing both a life of personal
sufficiency and room for new individuals. Obviously poverty and the prospect
of continuing poverty induce involuntary procreation, but above a certain level
we may expect that a decrease in the proportion of young members of a
population will also provide an economic incentive for procreation. The
emancipation duty can therefore also be rephrased as a duty to prevent the
need for intergenerational distributive justice, i.e., a duty to prevent society
from itself becoming responsible.
(2) Assuming now that a social structure is in place that allows individuals to
voluntarily choose whether or not to procreate, we can and must hold parents
primarily responsible for their decisions and the consequences thereof
(cf. Velleman 2008; Steiner and Vallentyne 2009). Hence, a parental duty
to procreate if and only if their future child’s wellbeing can be reasonably
assured takes precedence over all of society’s real and imagined obligations as
well as—after all, justice is cold and jealous—over love and stupidity.
(3) It does not follow automatically that parents are also obligated to care for their
child; for this we need the additional premises that no child deserves its lot in
life (cf. Velleman 2008) and that those causally responsible for this fate are
also morally primarily responsible. This results in a parental duty not to
impose avoidable suffering on their future child. Whether there is also a
concurrent duty to benefit the child whenever possible, i.e., to maximize its
wellbeing (with consideration for the effects on others), probably depends on
the measure of wellbeing: e.g., a resourcist view of the good life need not
support such a duty if it understands the good life in terms of sufficiency.
(4) Responsible parents carry responsibility not just for the fate of their child but
also for its impact on the wellbeing of third parties — hence the ‘‘parents pay’’
principle: a parental duty to compensate any third parties unfairly disadvan-
taged by the creation of their child.9 There is no concurrent right to be
8 An anonymous reviewer remarked at this point: ‘‘In the era of diminishing natural resources, climate
change and so on, urgency of problems and not (anthropo)logical precedence should define our priority.’’
Politically speaking, this may be correct (or not), but this article deals with intergenerational justice, and
justice is usually assumed to apply in circumstances of moderate scarcity, not to the kind of disastrous
conditions that would overrule the demands of justice.
9 ‘‘Unfairly’’ is added for two reasons: (1) since my rights may trump yours, implying that compensation
is not required; and (2) since one cannot be held responsible for what cannot be foreseen. Obviously the
precise demarcation of cases that do and do not demand compensation is highly controversial – but (cf.
e.g., Hadley 2005; Sheard 2007) it is in no relevant way different from drawing such lines for any other
risk or burden imposed on third parties, like the external costs of production processes, the original
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compensated by third parties (individuals or society as a whole) for any
unsolicited advantages bestowed on the latter (cf. Steiner and Vallentyne
2009), although third parties may be free to do so. After all, to demand an
appropriate compensation for sending someone an unasked-for new car or a
twenty-volume encyclopaedia is considered absurd.
(5) Society has no direct duties towards parents (other than to guarantee truly free
choice on procreation), but it has a duty to take over the parents’ responsibility
where the latter fail. It is morally responsible, as guardian in loco parentis, for
the fate of the child — carrying secondary responsibility after the parents for
‘‘voluntary’’ future individuals and primary responsibility for ‘‘involuntary’’
children. In addition, it is responsible for the fate of third parties. In all these
cases, the arbitrariness principle kicks in again — no child and no third party
deserves parents who fail their obligations.
(6/7) In causal terms, parents and society carry their respective responsibilities
only for newly created individuals, metaphorically speaking ‘‘the next
generation.’’ It is this next generation that is, in turn, causally responsible for
the fate of its successors—and so on. This chain of causal responsibility,
combined with the arbitrariness principle (we could have ended up in any
generation) has two implications.
First, (6) each generation (individual parents as well as society in their respective
capacities) is morally responsible for providing the next with the capacity to fulfill
its duties as potential future parents or guardians; hence each generation has a duty
to provide the next generation with as much procreative freedom as possible, up to
the level of freedom that it enjoyed itself, and it is free but not obliged to do more.
Thus, above and beyond the level of strict sustainability, every generation is at
liberty, not obliged, to provide for (research into) more efficient use of resources and
the development of new resources. By procreative freedom, for the record, I mean
the presence of the means and opportunity to be responsible for the consequences of
the creation of an indeterminate number of future individuals. It does not imply a
duty to reproduce (cf. Steiner and Vallentyne 2009), not even up (or down) to the
level required to maintain a viable and sustainable reproduction rate within society;
the slow and natural extinction of humanity remains an option. It does imply a duty
to make such a sustainable level of reproduction an option—but the choice whether
or not to use that opportunity lies with the individuals. Wombs and testes are not
collective property.
Secondly, (7) each generation has a duty to inspire in the next generation a
similar sense of duty as prescribed by principle 6.
So where does all this leave the idea of intergenerational distributive justice, of
society as a steward of the property of an intergenerational collective? It is still very
much alive, but not as we know it. Let me highlight four pertinent consequences of
logically prioritizing individual responsibility and justice in exchange over
intergenerational redistribution.
Footnote 9 continued
acquisition of natural resources or the destruction through use of resources (depriving others of a chance
to use or acquire them).
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First, on the ‘‘parents pay’’ view of duties towards future individuals, parents, and
sometimes in their stead society have a responsibility to guarantee any new child a
fair and sufficient share of society’s legitimate property, i.e., the benefits and
burdens of social cooperation. (They also owe it, by the way and by the same token,
the opportunity to contribute his or her fair and sufficient share to those benefits and
burdens.) This fair share may be assigned by any principle of distributive social
justice, and measured by any metric; we’ll leave that choice undetermined. What
matters is that those principles and metric take account of not just the direct day-
to-day needs of individuals, but also of long term interests as expressed in, for
instance, the Rawlsian and Nozickian plan of life. Such a plan of life will include
(see duties 6 and 7 above) at least the opportunity to consider procreation. Thus, the
existing and new individuals to whom the collective attributes shares in its property
(natural resources and social product) are to be conceived of as more complete
individuals than most theories of justice do today. Humans do not just hope or aspire
(or not—if they so choose) to a career in this field, perfection in that activity, leisure
through specific hobbies or sports, enlightenment through religion or art, and so
on—they also aspire (or not) to being good, caring parents. In yet other words: the
individual subject of social justice is a representative of members of the next
generation, and through those members, a representative of all generations to come.
Secondly, understanding the option of procreation as part of a human being’s
legitimate goals in life, as part of his or her interests, implies that a principle of
intergenerational distributive justice still needs to be part of a complete theory of
justice, albeit in a roundabout way. It may also seem to imply a bias in favor of this
being the popular No Worse Off (NWO) principle—the present generation should
leave future generations no worse off than it is itself (cf. e.g., Steiner and Vallentyne
2009). Yet, NWO is too simple: it prohibits, for instance, any investment however,
small at the cost of one generation to the benefit, however, great, of later ones
(cf. Wissenburg 1998), where even a Kantian deontologist would wish to argue for
such investments provided the aim were not the maximization of welfare as such but
the promotion of future individuals’ perspectives of autonomy.
Whatever (other) rule may come to guide society’s obligations to future
individuals through present ones, it will, thirdly, have to be accompanied by a
savings principle. Society, after all, is a parent too, or (see duty 5) at least a guardian
for children whose parents, voluntarily or not, fail to take responsibility for them.
The difference with a Rawlsian savings principle, however, is that it would not be a
tax punishing non-procreators but would instead consist in a rule for estimating the
number of ‘‘orphans’’ society represents here and now, in addition to the ‘‘non-
orphaned’’ already represented by their parents.
Fourth and last, acknowledging the role of responsibility in procreation means
that theorists of intergenerational justice will face new questions. The Parfitian
questions how many people and who there should be, and what kind of life we wish
to create for them, may be prior to the more action-oriented question how much
precisely we owe to future generations in terms of natural resources, capital,
security, or health, but both are in their turn preceded by the primary responsibility
of individual parents for their individual progeny. In more accessible terms:
deciding what to collectively save for the future comes second to asking what future
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is desirable per se, and third to asking, individually, whether it is prudent to
procreate or not. It is the last question that determines the size of future generations’
rightful (or wishful) claims and the gap between promises we can and cannot fulfill.
This amended mission for intergenerational redistribution is of course based on
two debatable premises: that there actually is a legitimately obtained social stock to
provide a safety net for uncared-for children, and that it is a good thing to be
responsible. As to the first premise: carrying responsibility, in this case the
collective’s responsibility in loco parentis for the wellbeing of uncared-for children,
does not logically imply that one also has the means to act accordingly—that is
precisely what created the uncared-for in the first place. In a world where
responsibility counts, where the products of labor belong to the producing
individuals proportionate to their contribution (cf. Vallentyne 2007; Steiner and
Vallentyne 2009), the creation of a collective stock, a ‘‘social product’’ created by
e.g., taxation, is notoriously hard to justify. If there is any perspective for a
legitimate collective stock, it may well lie where left-libertarians like Vallentyne
et al. (2005) see it: in corrective taxation of those advantages individuals gain when
they use more than their fair share of nature’s collectively owned resources. One
could, perhaps, argue that any natural resources I appropriate include a taxable part
X that I took to be unclaimed, but that by rights belongs to the voiceless unborn or
the uncared-for.10 Still, apportioning fair shares to individuals who represent both
their own and the interests of their future offspring brings with it the further problem
of ascertaining how much resources not just individual Y deserves but also that
individual’s offspring. It will be clear that both the origins of the collective stock
and the metric for its allocation remain controversial topics.
The second major premise supporting the ‘‘parents pay’’ view of intergenera-
tional obligations is that it is an intrinsically good thing for an individual to be
responsible, a premise utilitarians (for instance) might question. I do not have the
room to defend this axiom adequately here; let me just point out that the capacity to
take personal responsibility is not only a necessary condition of a liberal view of the
good life, but also a necessary condition for a minimal version of autonomy, i.e.,
personal autonomy, the simple ability to choose (Waldron 2005; cf. Wolff 1990;
also Jonas 1979)—and thereby a necessary condition for attributing an entity the
ethical status of subject.
In this article I have focused exclusively on the implications for the philosophy of
intergenerational justice of a more realistic conceptualization of individual
responsibility and the value of future individuals. Policy implications have been
mostly ignored—I have not talked about whether and how irresponsible parents
should be sanctioned, for instance, or whether prioritizing individual responsibility
implicitly allows burdening future generations, ‘‘other people’s children,’’ with
10 Rather than by a state with collective assets, the collective responsibility for uncared-for future
individuals could alternatively just as well be discharged by charitable organizations fuelled by
benevolence (a virtue for which distributive social justice offers hardly any room). Although perhaps a far
less viable solution in practical terms, it has the advantage of theoretical simplicity and consistency—and
the added advantage of probably discouraging ‘‘careless procreation’’ for more than a system that,
through solidarity, promises no ill consequences will befall parent or child for whatever degree and kind
of carelessness.
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debts or with a seriously diminished range of choices in life styles. I want to end,
nevertheless, by highlighting one important ‘‘practical’’ consequence. The ‘‘parents
pay’’ view of duties towards future generations limits the freedom of choice of a
society (liberal democratic or other) when it comes to population policy and
‘‘procreation management.’’ There is no denying that even in liberal democracies,
‘‘the collective’’ pre-empts many of the individual’s choices, including those in the
area of procreation: states shape the educational system, the labor market, the
economy, social security, and child benefit systems. Unlike Platonic totalitarianism
with its breeding programs, liberal democracy accepts that there are limits to the
duties and burdens it can legitimately impose on its citizens. Individual desires may
sometimes have to give way to the interests of the collective, but in a liberal
democracy individuals are never sacrificed for the good of the community. Liberal
social and political institutions aim to serve the interests of individuals, a mission
that is incompatible with a view of individuals as possessed by the collective, and a
mission that is therefore also incompatible with the idea that procreation is first of
all a collective and only in second place an individual concern—quite the reverse is
true. To make a long story short: the ‘‘parents pay’’ view asks that collective choices
affecting the individual lives of real-existing human beings take as their primary
aim respect for all existing individuals rather than only those who would procreate;
in other words, ‘‘parents pay’’ calls for the emancipation of individuals (including
procreative autonomy) rather than the redistribution of dependence.
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